Myanmar’s junta has been mobilized forces for offensives in the Mandalay, Sagaing and Magway regions at the same that it has significantly reduced...
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China's continued support for Myanmar's military junta is not only morally questionable but also strategically short-sighted. By backing an unpopular regime whose grip on power is tenuous at best, against the clear wishes of the Myanmar people, Beijing risks severe long-term consequences for its regional influence and economic interests. Recent developments highlighting the resilience of resistance forces have exposed the flaws in Beijing's approach. Despite superior armaments, a comprehensive investigation by BBC World Service indicates that the military now maintains control over less than a quarter of Myanmar's territory, a clear indication of their waning authority. Meanwhile, the National Unity Government (NUG) enjoys overwhelming popular support, 92% according to a United States Institute of Peace (USIP) survey, with the majority of Myanmar's diverse population viewing it favorably. This groundswell of opposition to military rule is not a fleeting phenomenon but the culmination of 70 years of failed governance and oppression. China's backing of the junta exacerbates an already dire humanitarian crisis. As of early December 2024, approximately 3.4 million people were displaced within Myanmar. Myanmar's stability hangs by a thread. The junta's mismanagement has doubled poverty rates to 40% in 2022, creating an economic quagmire that threatens to engulf the region. The junta's grip on power is rapidly eroding, with resistance forces delivering historic defeats to the military in northern Myanmar. In a stunning turn of events, resistance forces in northern Myanmar delivered a historic defeat to the military in early August, toppling the northeastern command and bringing expansive territories across northern Shan State under their control. Recently the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) gained control of areas rich in rare earth elements (REEs) and the Arakanese Army (AA) has nearly gained control of the entire Rakhine state. On December 20, 2024, the AA claimed to have "completely captured" the Western Regional Command headquarters in Ann, Rakhine state China's response has been both aggressive and counterproductive: Unleashing punitive measures targeting key resistance groups Cutting off resources to resistance forces Pressuring Ethnic Resistance Organizations (ERO) for ceasefires Tacitly approving military airstrikes with China-provided hardware Showering junta leader Min Aung Hlaing with unprecedented legitimacy Financing and technically assisting sham elections in 2025. The international community views China's support for the junta's proposed elections as endorsing a process designed to exclude genuine opposition. These actions not only exacerbate the humanitarian crisis but also alienate the Myanmar people, who overwhelmingly support the resistance movement. China’s actions have triggered worldwide protest rallies by the Myanmar diaspora which had been joined by Chinese dissidents and covered by their media in Los Angeles and San Francisco. The economic implications of China's misguided policy are becoming increasingly apparent to the Myanmar public. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), with its oil and gas pipelines estimated at $2.5 billion and the $7.3 billion Kyaukphyu deep-sea port project, promises economic growth but at a severe cost. These projects have led to widespread land confiscation, displacing thousands without adequate compensation and sparking protests. Environmental degradation threatens local ecosystems and the livelihoods of communities dependent on agriculture and fishing. Myanmar's increasing dependence on Chinese investments raises concerns about national sovereignty and potential debt traps, which might limit its ability to negotiate favorable terms for future projects. Myanmar owes $4 billion of its $10 billion national debt to China, with Chinese loans carrying higher interest rates (up to 4.5%) compared to international lenders like the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These loans have been described as burdensome, particularly since they often finance projects of strategic value to China rather than benefiting local communities. The lack of transparency and high costs associated with these projects exacerbate concerns about falling into a debt trap. Resistance forces have shown remarkable resilience to Chinese pressure to stop fighting the junta, defying Beijing by continuing revolutionary activities. In a significant development, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) on October 18, 2024, took control of Pang War township, bringing billions of dollars’ worth of rare earth mines under its control. This movement challenges China's dominance in the rare earth market and provides significant economic leverage to resistance groups. China announced on December 3, 2024, that it would ban the export of several rare minerals to the United States. Myanmar exported approximately 50,000 metric tons of rare earth oxides to China in 2023, surpassing China's own mining quota. The local Kachin population wants to suspend the production from these rare earth mines due to significant environmental damage which has severely affected the health and livelihoods of the local people. China imposed a trade embargo on the Kachin cutting off electricity and imports of essential goods, including fuel, chemicals, and food. The Kachins have not resumed the production of REEs to date. The embargo of essential goods imports was also imposed on the two members of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, T’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an armed resistance group operating in the Kokang region of Myanmar, to stop fighting the junta. While the EROs have not fully complied with China's demands, there are signs of impact: The TNLA and MNDAA have expressed willingness to participate in Chinese-brokered peace talks with the Myanmar junta. The trade restrictions have weakened the resistance groups both militarily and politically, making them more likely to comply with Beijing's demands. The pressure from China on these groups has been described as "the most formidable in recent times. China's demand for a joint venture security company to protect its investments in Myanmar is particularly alarming. It is perceived by the Myanmar people as a thinly veiled attempt at direct territorial control, echoing neo-colonial practices that have no place in the 21st century. This move, along with China's shielding of the junta at the UN, is rapidly eroding any goodwill among Myanmar's populace. China's international standing, already under scrutiny, will suffer further if it continues to be seen as aligning itself with a regime facing potential war crimes charges. On November 27, 2024, the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Karim Khan filed a request for an arrest warrant for Myanmar Junta's Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. The warrant was requested for crimes against humanity. The people of Myanmar are not seeking to become pawns in a geopolitical chess game. They desire a balanced foreign policy, neither pro-West nor pro-China, focused on mutual benefit and respect for sovereignty. By ignoring these aspirations, China risks pushing Myanmar closer to other regional powers, potentially losing influence in this strategically crucial nation. China has already lost the goodwill of the people of Myanmar. China has an opportunity to recalibrate its approach. Engaging with the NUG and ethnic armed organizations to support a peaceful transition to democratic rule would demonstrate true leadership. Prioritizing transparency, environmental protection, and local economic development in future projects would go a long way in rebuilding trust. Leverage China’s influence to encourage genuine political dialogue and reconciliation, rather than supporting the junta's flawed election plans would be very beneficial. Failure to do so not only betray the principles of non-interference that China claims to uphold but also jeopardizes its long-term strategic interests in Southeast Asia. If the people of Myanmar are left with nowhere to turn except to their own determination and hope, they will persevere to the last person. Unlike North Korea, Myanmar can't be easily isolated, thanks to Myanmar’s strategic location which resulted in China's intended use of Myanmar as a BRI hub. China faces a hard choice and needs to rethink.
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